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Abstract: This Special Issue revisits the classic question of comparative corporate 
governance research, namely whether national corporate governance systems are 
converging. More specifically, it focuses on several ‘convergence vectors’ which comprise 
the political, legal, economic and social arrangements that influence or drive the 
international trajectories of governance systems toward a common denominator. Taken 
together, the contributors to this Special Issue invite us to think critically about the 
functional explanations commonly mobilized in favour of convergence and consider instead 
the convergence debate from a broader and more interdisciplinary point of view.  
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Introducing the issues 
The prevailing consensus in the UK and other countries influenced by an Anglo-American 
approach to corporate governance is that companies ought to be run in the collective interests 
of their shareholders. This is generally taken to imply that the best way to approach the 
question of corporate governance reform is to consider ways that enhance shareholder power 
in a manner that is congruent with self-regulation. While the idea of strengthening the voice 
of non-shareholder stakeholders is regularly mentioned by policymakers, actual policy 
reforms invariably rest on the extension of shareholder influence. This was certainly the 
dynamic in the recent drive to reform corporate governance in the UK. The Department of 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, for example, considered stakeholder involvement 
in governance at the consultation and Parliamentary debate stages (Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2016, 2017; Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee, 2017), but little or no changes in this direction were visible in the new Corporate 
Governance Code subsequently released by the Financial Reporting Council.   
The reluctance to deviate from the so-called ‘shareholder primacy norm’ is 
underpinned by a set of theoretical, empirical and normative arguments. One of the most 
potent among these is the belief that the market forces unleashed by financialization and 
globalization have produced a convergence toward a common denominator. Given the nodal 
as well as ideological centrality of Wall Street and the City of London, many believe this 
denominator to be the shareholder-centric model typical of Anglo-American capitalism, a 
state of affairs hyperbolically described as ‘the end of history’ (Hansmann & Kraakman, 
2001). The conclusion is thus drawn that unilateral policy deviations from this global 
benchmark are ill-advised. For example, it is surmised, attempts to move toward employee 
or stakeholder representation on boards can only lead capital and talent to move to more 
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accommodating shores, eroding competitiveness and ultimately harming the very same 
stakeholders in whose name the reforms were proposed. 
This paternalistic logic is buttressed by the belief that in countries whose corporate 
governance systems are not geared to the maximization of shareholder value, agency costs 
are rife, investor protections are weak and capital markets fail to allocate resources 
efficiently, with adverse effects on growth and innovation. Not surprisingly, in line with one 
of the key implications of the ‘law and finance’ literature (La Porta et al., 2000), such 
countries seek to replicate the superior Anglo-American system. These countries do not 
really have that much of a choice, the thinking goes. As writers in the ‘law and economics’ 
tradition have argued, capital mobility creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage among 
corporate law and governance rules (O’Hara & Ribstein, 2009). The same forces that explain 
why most US states tend to replicate Delaware’s General Corporation Law operate at the 
international level. When some countries successfully attract corporations, often through a 
combination of tax exemptions and investor-friendly policies, their competitors have a strong 
incentive to replicate the conditions of that success. The greater the number of imitators, the 
stronger the bandwagon effects which result in the widespread adoption of given bundles of 
rules.  
It is easy to be seduced by such functional explanations, particularly given the 
observable operation of various political, legal, economic and social forces that drive the 
international trajectories of governance systems. Some ‘convergence vectors’ are directly 
concerned with corporate governance. For instance, stock exchanges around the world now 
systematically require that international standards regarding board independence, 
information disclosure, auditing procedures, and other ‘best practices’ originating in Anglo-
American corporate governance codes be complied with as a condition for listing. Parallel 
developments include the globalization of financial reporting standards pushed by the 
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International Accounting Standards Board and other organizations, as well as the emergence 
of non-financial reporting standards pushed by the Global Reporting Initiative and others. 
Other vectors relate to broader trends which exert an indirect influence on the evolution of 
corporate governance rules and practices. One such vector is the partial harmonization of 
contract law produced by arbitration practices in international trade, a development also 
pushed by organizations such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law, whose Principles of International Commercial Contracts complement the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. And another is of course the emergence and 
organization of global value chains. 
However, such isomorphic tendencies do not, and doubtless will not, lead to anything 
resembling homogeneity. As the large literature on the varieties of capitalism and the related 
varieties of business systems (Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Whitley, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 
2001; Amable, 2003; Crouch, 2005; Morgan et al, 2005; Hancke, 2009; Morgan & Whitley, 
2012; Clift, 2014; Farkas, 2016) has emphasized, although some degree of convergence has 
occurred in some areas of corporate governance, there is strong evidence of persistent 
divergence in other areas of governance. This point has been widely recognized by 
comparative corporate lawyers (McCahery et al., 2002; Milhaupt, 2003; Gordon & Roe, 
2004; Siems, 2008; Fleckner & Hopt, 2012; Magnier, 2017) and has become an essential 
part of the conversation among corporate governance, human resource management, global 
value chains and international political economy scholars (Van den Berghe, 2002; Clarke, 
2004; Lane & Probert, 2009; Rasheed & Yoshikawa, 2012; Noorderhaven et al., 2015; 
Nölke & May, 2018). Whether they are explained by path dependence, institutional 
complementarities or political economy considerations, national differences, especially in 
the immediate post-Covid context, are likely to remain and potentially strengthen.  
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Introducing the contributions 
The five articles collected in this Special Issue make an original, interdisciplinary 
contribution to comparative corporate governance studies. Several of the convergence 
vectors mentioned above are critically examined in both their formal and narrative 
dimensions. Special attention is given to the political economy aspects of the convergence 
process. Each article can be read independently but is more usefully seen as one of a set of 
complementary contributions.  
The Special Issue opens with the provocative suggestion that the narratives and 
conversations about the legitimacy and suitability of imported norms, which must be 
involved in any process of convergence (and institutional change more generally), may have 
potentially performative powers. From this perspective, Jeroen Veldman and Hugh Willmott 
(2020) show how the widespread acceptance of agency theory and the attendant shareholder 
primacy norm, in the name of which convergence has more often than not been championed, 
can be understood using Emilio Marti and Jean-Pascal Gond’s (2018) process model of self-
fulfilling theories, which captures how social-scientific theories become performative in the 
generic, effective and Barnesian senses identified by Donald MacKenzie (2006). Generic 
performativity emerges whenever actors use a theory. Effective performativity arises when 
those uses have some effect on social reality. Barnesian performativity (named in honour of 
Barry Barnes’s important work on self-referential and self-validating feedback loops known 
as ‘bootstrapped inductions’) occurs when those effects bring social reality closer to the 
assumptions or predictions of the theory. A theory becomes truly performative, Marti and 
Gond suggest, when certain boundary conditions are met at each of these three steps. 
Veldman and Willmott apply these ideas to the recent history of the theorization of the 
corporation. 
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Theories of the corporation have always relied on contingent and contested political 
economy claims regarding its status, purpose and governance. The complex narratives, 
behaviours and institutional changes that accompanied the weakening of managerial 
capitalism in the 1970s and its gradual replacement by the agency-theoretic shareholder 
value maximization approach, Veldman and Willmott contend, present a particularly clear 
case of ‘performativity in action’ where, in this example, agency theory contributes to 
creating conditions that lend credibility to its claims. The re-description of the corporation as 
a nexus of contracts and the depiction of shareholders as principals whose interests directors 
must serve (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) was eagerly embraced and effectively promulgated 
by powerful interest groups and norm entrepreneurs who gained positions of economic, legal 
and political influence. These actors have championed the radical reform of managerial 
education and have developed the financial instruments, corporate governance codes and 
accounting standards that determine the way governance, and its potential reform, are 
conceived. Crucially, this account challenges accounts of growing convergence that are 
couched in ostensibly apolitical, purely functional terms. Convergence, Veldman and 
Willmott conclude, must be viewed in light of the conditions shaping and legitimizing 
certain political economy outcomes.  
The remaining contributions to the Special Issue are not expressed in terms of 
performativity, but underline, to varying degrees, the importance of these conditions. The 
globalization of financial reporting norms is a case in point. The economic rationale for 
compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) – with which listed 
companies in more than half of the world’s countries comply – focuses on how these 
facilitate financial transparency, reduce information asymmetries, foster convergent 
expectations, enable the cross-country comparability, lower the costs of capital and enhance 
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capital market efficiency.1 The existence of such potential benefits, however, is insufficient 
to explain how local actors, in this case national accounting professionals, came to accept the 
legitimacy of imported standards and eventually adopted them. Andreas Jansson (2020) 
shows that in the Swedish case, prior to its formal adoption across the EU in 2005, the 
gradual integration of IFRS was accomplished on a voluntary basis and accompanied by 
narratives revolving around the importance of capital markets and the inevitability of global 
standards, which political economy scholars have long argued are essential to the process of 
financialization (e.g. Nölke & Perry, 2007).  
It is important to understand, Jansson argues, that the formal requirement to align 
with certain regulatory standards is often the end point rather than the beginning of a 
convergence trajectory. This is particularly the case with IFRS, which introduced a 
fundamental cultural-cognitive shift away from historical cost measurement to a capital 
market-based view of asset valuation (known as ‘fair value’ accounting). In line with the 
institutional perspective associated with Richard Scott (2001) and others, for such a shift to 
occur, powerful actors, including senior auditors, accounting academics and high-ranking 
corporate managers, must first embrace the normative foundations of fair value accounting 
and lead a process of discursive delegitimation and deinstitutionalization of existing 
practices, which makes room for the legitimation and institutionalization of a new set of 
practices. These changes are difficult to observe directly, but Jansson’s recourse to discourse 
analysis to study a corpus of articles published in the journal of the Swedish association of 
chartered accountants in the years leading up the formal adoption of IFRS reveals how they 
played out.   
 
1 See https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/who-we-are.  
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Part of the narrative process that allows the legitimation and institutionalization of 
new standards or rules that lawmakers and regulators propose to import involves presenting 
these novelties as necessary steps on the pathway toward efficiency. Tellingly, the rationale 
for introducing a corporate governance code invariably relies on the influential empirical 
research conducted by economists Rafael La Porta et al. (2000), which shows that this 
facilitates external finance, favours capital market liquidity and more generally enhances a 
country’s attractivity to business. One key problem with this approach is that it is assumed 
that the transplantation of legal rules from one institutional context to another is a seamless 
process which yields the expected outcome. Ulf Larsson-Olaison (2020) takes issue with this 
simplistic view. Legal transplants, he argues, are not merely products of technical or 
functional fine-tuning but typically result from complex political processes and 
compromises. They tend to be experimental and often lead to unexpected consequences. 
Furthermore, there are different ways to assess the degree to which a transplant is successful. 
Different criteria may be employed to evaluate a given legal transplant at different points in 
time. 
Alternative evaluation criteria can be usefully depicted thanks to what Larsson-
Olaison calls a ‘transplant staircase’, which comprises four steps. The first step or criterion 
(that he calls ‘transplant as label’) is rather superficial: the transplant of some international 
rule is successful if it can be found on the law books of the receiving country. A more 
substantive second step (‘transplant as content’) considers the degree to which the content of 
the formal rule is adapted to the local context, while the third step (‘transplant as practice’) 
captures the extent to which that content produces actual effects on local actors. Only then 
can the social outcomes produced in the source and the receiving countries be meaningfully 
compared (‘transplant as outcome’). Applying these ideas to the Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code, which came into force in 2005, having been elaborated on the basis of the 
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UK Corporate Governance Code, Larsson-Olaison shows how the key features of 
independent directors, nomination committees and the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach fit into 
the staircase model. Overall, he concludes, there is more or less convergence, depending on 
the feature examined and the criterion used. 
Sweden is just one of many countries around the world that have adopted a UK-style 
corporate governance code. Not surprisingly, the proliferation of codes has often been 
presented as a key convergence vector (e.g. Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Codes of 
best practice are ‘soft law’ or self-regulation tools that are meant to empower shareholders 
vis-à-vis otherwise entrenched managers by ensuring that independent directors are in a 
position to monitor managers thanks to robust disclosure procedures. This focus is sensible 
in the UK, where shareholding is dispersed, institutional investors actively monitor 
compliance based on the ‘comply-or-explain’ approach, and courts can be relied upon to 
protect shareholders rights. While the UK Corporate Governance Code may achieve its 
objective, the same cannot be said of most of the emerging and developing countries that 
have followed suit. In these countries, as Umakanth Varottil (2020) argues, concentrated 
ownership is the norm. Codes that are meant to empower shareholders only strengthen 
dominant shareholder control and enhance their private benefits to the detriment of minority 
investors, who are unable to rely on robust court systems to defend their rights. Measures 
specifically designed to ensure that directors act in the interests of minority shareholders are 
needed.   
In this respect, Varottil explains, reliance on codes alone is insufficient, not least 
because remedies available to shareholders but also matters of director appointment and 
removal, all of which are essential in the prevention of self-dealing, related party 
transactions and other abuses, are normally dealt with in mandatory or ‘hard’ corporate law. 
But corporate law tends to reflect the political power of various interest groups, as Peter 
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Gourevich and James Shinn (2005) have argued, with the implication that blockholders in 
family- or state-controlled companies are able to successfully resist the sorts of legal changes 
required to protect minority shareholders. The enthusiastic adoption of international 
standards of corporate governance is a legitimacy-signalling exercise designed to attract 
foreign investments, with little changing under the surface. One way to tackle this problem, 
Varottil suggests, is to promote the adoption of codes specifically tailored to the governance 
problems arising in family-controlled and state-controlled companies. To date, very few of 
these codes have been adopted. The extent to which they may be beneficial, however, 
remains an empirical question that needs to be addressed, particularly in developing and 
emerging countries. 
The comparative corporate governance literature often identifies instances of 
‘decoupling’ between de jure convergence and de facto divergence (e.g. Rasheed & 
Yoshikawa, 2012). This pattern, as Olivier Butzbach and Gennaro Rotondo (2020) argue, 
does not fit the banking industry. Contrary to how banks are portrayed by Eugene Fama 
(1980) and other financial economists, banks are not just special kinds of firms. They are 
financial institutions that generate money claims on the economy which have public good 
features, and whose operation relies on high levels of personal and societal trust. They are 
more leveraged and more exposed to capital markets than other firms and must deal with a 
wider variety of agency problems (e.g. depositors and not just shareholders are principals). 
They are also more regulated and historically have adopted a variety of alternative 
organizational forms. In principle, these features reduce the likelihood of convergence in 
banking, but three decades of privatization and liberalization of banking around the world 
may have pushed banks, along with other corporations, toward a shareholder-oriented 
governance model. Surprisingly few studies have focused on this question to date.  
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Butzbach and Rotondo address this lacuna by considering the Italian case. For the 
most part of the 20th century, equity in most of the legal forms Italian credit institutions 
could take was held by public entities, whose boards were appointed by central, regional or 
local government. In the early 1990s, most banks were transformed into joint-stock 
companies and their capital was gradually privatized. By the end of the decade, a corporate 
governance code for listed companies was adopted. Today, contrary to many other Italian 
firms which remain family-controlled, the largest banking groups look very much like their 
Anglo-American counterparts, with diffused ownership and a few minority institutional 
investors. Yet obstacles to convergence persist. In line with European regulations designed 
to insulate banks from potentially destabilizing shareholder behaviour, there are legal limits 
on shareholder rights as regards the acquisition and sale of equity stakes, as well as 
limitations on the exercise of voting rights. Contrary to the political economy literature 
associated with Mark Roe (2003) and others, this state of affairs is not due to the resistance 
to change by powerful interest groups but rather to tensions within the law itself.   
Competition & Change: uniquely placed to advance the conversation 
Taken together, the contributors to this Special Issue invite us to shed simplistic framings 
and intuitions about the convergence debate. The processes underpinning the observed 
trajectories of convergence and divergence are complex and multi-faceted. Many (although 
by no means all) of the kinds of functional analyses employed in economics and finance 
assume straightforward causalities, ignore the constitutive powers of narratives, downplay 
the role of contingency and more generally miss many of the relevant political economy 
considerations. More specifically, they underplay the subordination of corporate governance 
reform to the prioritization of capital market efficiency and liquidity; and this priority is 
11 
 
represented in terms of Panglossian benefits to adopters rather than to owners and lenders of 
capital, with may impact growing inequality both nationally and internationally. This does 
not mean that the standard economic approach should be dismissed – it contains a ‘grain of 
truth’, but simply not ‘the whole truth and nothing but the truth’. An important question that 
institutional and political economy approaches can shed a light on is how and why this grain 
of truth is mobilized by sophisticated actors in the complex process of convergence (or 
institutional change more generally), and to what effect.  
Competition & Change has long been devoted to advancing this agenda. In the past 
two decades, the journal has carried some excellent papers on corporate governance (e.g. 
Lane, 2003; Pendleton, 2005; Vliegenthart & Horn, 2007; Aglietta, 2008; Rahim, 2012; 
Maisenbacher, 2018). We hope that this Special Issue will stimulate further research and 
help cement the journal’s reputation as an interdisciplinary outlet for critical perspectives on 
the causes and consequences of competition and institutional change with respect to 
globalization, financialization, corporate governance, and broader conceptualizations of 
capitalist relations. 
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